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INTRODUCTION 
The law treats our companion animals, for most purposes, the same 
as other forms of chattel: a pair of shoes, a chair, a cell phone. But how 
can this be so? How can the law not discern between sentient beings 
and inanimate objects? How can the animals we dote on, dress up, and 
 
* Erica R. Tatoian is a juris doctor candidate in her third year at the University of Oregon 
School of Law. She would like to thank Professor Caroline Forell for her help and guidance 
in writing this Comment and the staff editors and managing board of JELL. She would also 
like to thank her parents, brother, and cat, Sebastian, for their continued support. 
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allow to sleep in our beds receive the same legal treatment as any other 
type of personal property? 
The concept of treating animals as mere property under the law is 
troubling for many reasons. Nevertheless, human beings have accepted 
“Cartesian notions of animals as machines, which support both the 
treatment of animals as property and definitions of humans as ‘not-
animals.’”1 Accepting these Cartesian notions justifies using animals 
for experiments, keeping them caged in zoos, and even mass-producing 
them in appalling conditions for our own consumption. Another reason 
for treating animals as mere property stems from the impracticability 
of giving them full “legal personhood” status. If labeled as “legal 
persons,” animals would have the standing as aggrieved persons, 
thereby allowing them to bring lawsuits to enforce the laws enacted to 
protect them.2 The image of a chimpanzee-plaintiff boggles the mind 
of many legalists, objections ranging from the inability to communicate 
to the inability to verify veracity. 
However, animals are characteristically different from other types of 
property. Property law recognizes rights that each property owner holds 
in her bundle of sticks. These rights include, but are not limited to, the 
right to possess, the right to use, the right to alienate, and the right to 
destroy.3 When applied to animals, the right to destroy, a quintessential 
stick in a property holder’s bundle, is limited. For example, statutory 
restrictions exist as to how animals may be killed, all emphasizing that 
if killing is legally permissible, it must be done humanely.4 Recent 
statutory interpretations and court decisions have put these notions of 
animals as property into question. Specifically, there has been a shift 
towards strengthening the legal status of animals, situating them 
somewhere between legal personhood and personal property. By 
occupying a space between legal personhood and personal property, 
animals have been afforded particular rights and protections, especially 
in Oregon. One recent Oregon Supreme Court decision interprets 
criminal statutory provisions to allow animals to be considered legal 
victims and a companion case extends the exigent circumstances 
 
1 Tamie L. Bryant, Living on the Edge: The Margins of Legal Personhood: Sacrificing 
the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, 
and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 247, 263 (2008). 
2 Id. at 258. 
3 Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 253 (2007). 
4 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 609.093 (setting forth a list of considerations that a court must 
consider in determining whether to euthanize a dog that has chased, menaced, or bit someone 
or something). 
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exception to the warrant requirement under the Oregon Constitution to 
encompass rescuing certain kinds of animals.5 
This Comment begins by explaining the historical development of 
animal jurisprudence, particularly focusing on the labeling of animals 
as personal property. Then, this Comment describes the various ways 
in which legal scholars have approached the concepts of attaining legal 
status for animals and the successes or practicability of such 
approaches. Next, this Comment points to recent Oregon court 
decisions that may be transforming common law conceptions of 
animals away from mere property status. In all, this Comment 
demonstrates that while some extreme methods have been suggested in 
transforming the legal status of animals, animals are instead 
increasingly recognized as occupying a space between the extremes—
between personal property and legal persons. 
I 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ANIMALS AS PROPERTY 
While the concept of property dates back to Roman law, providing 
differing degrees of protection for animals developed within English 
common law.6 English common law divided its protection between 
animals that were “useful” and animals of a base nature (wild animals).7 
Useful animals, such as cattle and sheep, were regarded by the common 
law as having an intrinsic value and, thus, afforded the same protection 
as goods. Wild animals were not considered property and, hence, could 
not be the subject of larceny and criminal action could not be brought 
for maliciously killing a wild animal.8 Remarkably, cats and dogs, 
animals now considered to be companion animals to humans, were 
considered as animals of a base nature until the early nineteenth century 
and therefore held a non-property status.9 “This meant that the keeper 
 
5 See State v. Nix (Nix II), 355 Or. 777 (2014), vacated, 356 Or. 768 (2015); State v. 
Fessenden, 355 Or. 759 (2014). As will be discussed, while Nix was vacated, State v. Hess, 
273 Or. App. 26 (2015) readopted the reasoning of Nix. 
6 David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1024–26 (2010). 
7 Id. at 1026. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 1026 n.18 (stating that “[a] clear statement of the legal status of dogs and cats did 
not appear in Virginia law until 1984: ‘All dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property 
and may be the subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass.’ VA. CODE ANN. § 
3.2-6585 (2008). Connecticut did not change its law until 1949, when the following was 
adopted: ‘All dogs are deemed to be personal property. . . . Any person who steals a dog 
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of the non-property animal [such as a dog] could not look to the 
protections of the law; an owner could not call the police if her dog had 
been stolen or killed. If the human owner’s interest in her dog was not 
recognized by the law, then clearly the interests of the dog were not 
recognized.”10 In sum, the common law provided protection for farm 
animals and not pets. 
Paradoxically, the English common law seems to juxtapose the way 
in which contemporary law characterizes animals as property. Today, 
the law affords more protection to pets and companion animals than it 
does to farm animals because of the socially recognized value 
associated with pets. This transformation began in 1867 with a New 
York law.11 The New York law was highly promoted by the founder of 
the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(“ASPCA”).12 The law defined an “animal” as every living creature 
except a human being and provided: 
A person who overdrives, overloads, tortures or cruelly beats or 
unjustifiably injures, maims, mutilates or kills any animal, or 
deprives any animal of necessary sustenance, food or drink, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than one 
year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both. 
Exclusions include properly conducted scientific tests, experiments 
or investigations, involving the use of living animals approved by the 
state commissioner of health.13 
The New York law expanded the common law by providing 
protections for all animals, requiring owners to provide adequate food 
and water, and providing an anti-cruelty provision that, if violated, 
would subject the owner to criminal penalties. Shortly thereafter, other 
states, including Oregon, began to adopt similar statutes following the 
New York model.14 “Besides the benefits to humans, the existence of 
these laws clearly reflects the legislatures’ acceptance of the 
proposition that an animal’s interest in being free from unnecessary 
 
may be prosecuted. . .’ CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-350 (West 2001).”); see also DAVID 
FAVRE & PETER L. BORCHELT, ANIMAL LAW AND DOG BEHAVIOR, 10–11 (1999). 
10 Favre, supra note 6, at 1026−27. 
11 Act of Apr. 12, 1867, ch. 375, § 1, 1867 N.Y. LAWS 86 (current version at N.Y. AGRIC. 
& MKTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 2015)); see also N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 331–379 
(McKinney 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 2015). 
12 Favre, supra note 6, at 1028. 
13 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 2015). 
14 Favre, supra note 6, at 1028. 
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pain and suffering should be recognized as a value within the legal 
system.”15 
Over the next several decades, the common law expanded state 
statutes to afford better protection for animals. “The requirement in the 
original New York law for providing food and water has been expanded 
significantly in many states to include food, water, shelter, and 
veterinary care.”16 Moreover, the punishment for violating these 
statutes has increased. Today, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands all contain felony provisions in 
their anti-cruelty statutes.17 
II 
LEGAL PERSONHOOD AND ATTAINING NON-PROPERTY STATUS 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a legal person as “an entity, such as 
corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of 
a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal 
reasoning is treated more or less as a human being.”18 However, animal 
advocates and legal scholars have attempted to expand and redefine the 
definition of legal personhood and its applicability towards animals for 
decades. As will be discussed, these legal scholars have articulated 
various ways in which legal personhood may be modified to 
encapsulate animals. 
A. A Narrow Approach to Legal Personhood 
Tamie Bryant, a legal scholar in animal law, argues that there are 
two definitions of legal personhood that may be applicable to animals.19 
One definition defines legal personhood broadly as “legal recognition 
of the extent to which animals should be considered ‘persons’ entitled 
to inclusion in the moral community such that humans cannot commit 
acts on animals that humans cannot commit on equally situated 
humans.”20 Bryant criticizes this broad definition of legal personhood 
 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1030. 
17 Oregon’s Felony Animal Cruelty Law–The “Kittles Bill,” ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, 
http://aldf.org/resources/laws-cases/oregons-felony-animal-cruelty-law-the-kittles-bill/ 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
18 Legal Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
19 Bryant, supra note 1, at 253. 
20 Id. 
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and its applicability to animals by arguing that such a definition 
requires proof that animals are substantially similar to humans, which 
fails for two reasons. First, humans are heavily invested in defining 
themselves in opposition to animals; and second, humans are heavily 
invested in using and consuming animals.21 Further, Bryant argues that 
such an approach would allow for only select species to gain legal 
personhood status, reinforcing a hierarchy between those species that 
qualify for status and those that do not.22 
The second definition that Bryant proposes for legal personhood of 
animals is narrower: “legal standing as an ‘aggrieved person’ entitled 
to sue to enforce laws ostensibly enacted to protect that aggrieved 
person from the harm he or she alleges.”23 Currently, animals lack legal 
standing and must rely on animal advocates to bring forth claims on 
their behalf, which creates a myriad of problems, particularly because 
the animal advocates are fighting against the property owners of the 
harmed animals in question. Bryant argues this definition is more 
acceptable because of “the idea that injured parties should have access 
to the courts to enforce existing law should, as a matter of logic, result 
in the recognition of standing for both the human and the animal to their 
respective injuries.”24 However, Bryant argues that accepting such an 
approach would only lead to the victimization of animals by creating 
ideas of superiority and entitlement of humans.25 According to Bryant’s 
view, then, even if animals were recognized as plaintiffs, the laws 
themselves would be interpreted as they currently are, and, therefore 
granting animals legal standing would not be helping them at all.26 
Further, Bryant argues that personhood cannot be pursued without 
addressing the status of animals as property.27 
B. Shifting Towards a Non-Property Status 
Another animal jurisprudence theorist, Thomas Kelch, points to the 
shift in both judicial decisions and legislative enactments away from 
regarding animals as mere property—a shift towards a non-property 
 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 254. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 293. 
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status.28 For example, the non-property status theory points to the fact 
that “some courts have moved away from always using a market value 
measure of damages for injuries to and killing of animals.”29 In Corso 
v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital., Inc.,30 the court assessed the proper 
measure of damages for mishandling the body of a euthanized dog and 
stated that companion animals should be seen as occupying a status 
above that of ordinary property.31 The court stated, “[t]his court now 
overrules prior precedent and holds that a pet is not just a thing but 
occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and personal 
property . . . . A pet is not an inanimate thing that just receives affection; 
it also returns it.”32 Kelch notes that the court was careful to distinguish 
its ruling from cases that allow special damages for loss of an heirloom. 
“Rather, the court recognized that pets are something more than 
property, due to the fact that animals are living creatures with feelings, 
emotions, and affection, and are more than just objects.”33 
It is important to note that the Corsco court narrowed its holding to 
pets as companion animals, but the holding has more recently been 
applied in New York. In Hennet v. Allan,34 the court reemphasized the 
holding in Corsco by stating, “[t]oday, we should take the next step in 
recognizing that pets are more than just ‘personal property’ when it 
comes to resolving a dispute between owners. . . . [P]ets should be 
recognized as a ‘special category of property.’”35 Again, the court 
emphasized that pets hold a unique status, and such a result 
demonstrates the willingness of courts to depart from applying a strict 
property characterization to companion animals. If other courts follow 
the New York courts’ approach, animal advocates could more easily 
argue that other animals, such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and elephants, 
which have been proven to have complex cognitive abilities, fit within 
the special category and deserve a non-property status. 
As for legislative enactments, the non-property theory points to few 
advancements in shifting notions of animals as property, despite the 
 
28 Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. L.J. 531, 536 
(1998). 
29 Id. 
30 Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979). 
31 Id. at 183; Kelch, supra note 28, at 538. 
32 Id. (quoting Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183). 
33 Id. 
34 Hennet v. Allan, 981 N.Y.S.2d. 293, 297 (2014). 
35 Id. at 297. 
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advances in common law. In order to continue the advancement in the 
common law, Kelch proposes that animals be deemed as holders of 
certain legal rights.36 “These rights would be based on the fact that 
animals have interests; that their lives can fare well or badly based upon 
how they are treated.”37 Kelch argues that the mechanism for asserting 
animal interests should be entrusted to animal groups or concerned 
individuals who would be the “guardians” of the interests of animals, 
much like guardians are routinely appointed for children and those who 
are not competent to assert their own claims.38 Accordingly, such 
guardians could acquire standing through the test proposed in Animal 
Lovers Volunteer Ass’n v. Weinberger,39 where “the court appeared to 
suggest that an organization [could] have standing when there is a 
longevity of commitment in the organization to preventing inhumane 
treatment of animals.”40 This approach to providing standing for 
guardians of animal interests would allow animal welfare 
organizations, such as the Animal Legal Defense Fund and the 
Nonhuman Right Project, to more easily advocate on behalf of animals. 
C. Legal Personhood via the Capacity to Possess a Legal Right 
Another approach towards moving away from a property status has 
been suggested by Steven Wise. According to Wise, “legal personhood 
is the capacity to possess at least one legal right; accordingly, one who 
possesses at least one legal right is a legal person.”41 Wise explains the 
theory of animal rights jurisprudence through the use of an “Animal 
Rights Pyramid”: 
  
 
36 Kelch, supra note 28, at 582. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 584. 
39 Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass’n v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1985). 
40 Kelch, supra note 28, at 584 (paraphrasing court in Animal Lovers, 765 F.2d. at 939, 
where the court stated, “ALVA lacks the longevity and indicia of commitment to preventing 
inhumane behavior which gave standing to Fund for Animals, and which might provide 
standing to other better known organizations.”). 
41 Steven M. Wise, Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project, 17 ANIMAL L. 
1, 1 (2010). 
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 42 
  Steven Wise’s Animal Rights Pyramid43 
In determining how animals are perceived in the legal context, the 
pyramid helps to demonstrate the ways in which standing is acquired. 
The pyramid can be viewed as if each base is a rung on a ladder, in that 
each base must be met before proceeding to the next base level. Thus, 
standing (level 4) cannot be achieved unless one has a private right of 
action (level 3), possesses legal rights (level 2), and is considered a 
legal person (level 1). Currently, animals do not even exist within the 
pyramid scheme, as they are not deemed to be legal persons. Wise 
founded the Nonhuman Rights Project, which focuses on shifting the 
paradigm so that common law recognizes that animals have the 
capacity to be declared a legal person (level 1).44 According to Wise, 
“[t]his nonhuman animal need not actually possess a legal right. But 
she must have the capacity to possess one.”45 Such capacity would 
acquire level 2 status, and the animal would progress to level 3, and so 
on. Wise argues that the legal right that allows animals to climb the 
pyramid is that of dignity. “[D]ignity is one sufficient generator of 
fundamental legal rights and that autonomy is at least one sufficient 
generator of dignity.”46 In asserting that autonomous animals possesses 
dignity through their autonomy, the Nonhuman Rights Projects is 
beginning to litigate on behalf of chimpanzees, elephants, dolphins, and 
whales because they are the most cognitively complex animals and 
 
42 Id. at 2. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 6. 
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most similar to human beings. These animals in particular are complex 
individuals who have deep emotions, understand each other’s minds, 
live in complicated societies, transmit culture, use sophisticated 
communication, solve difficult problems, and even mourn the loss of 
their loved ones.47 
It appears as though the Nonhuman Rights Project’s plans to have 
animals declared as legal persons have not ultimately failed, but rather 
cases have been dismissed on other grounds.48 For example, Wise’s 
most recent published case arose from his Nonhuman Rights Project on 
behalf of Kiko, a chimpanzee, for whom Wise sought a writ of habeas 
corpus.49 According to the complaint, a primate sanctuary was 
improperly imprisoning Kiko, and the Nonhuman Rights Project 
sought to have him transferred to another facility. The Nonhuman 
Rights Project, during oral argument, explained that Kiko was being 
kept in a cemented storefront with chains around his neck.50 The 
Nonhuman Rights Project based its habeas corpus petition on the need 
for Kiko’s self-determination and autonomy to be respected.51 In its 
argument, the Nonhuman Rights Project asserted that Kiko is a legal 
person, and not property, for purposes of habeas corpus: 
Because, if Kiko is a common law . . . person within the meaning of 
a writ of habeas corpus, then at that point that would override it. That 
was exactly what occurred, for example, in the momentous case of     
. . . the Somerset case, where you had a slave, James Somerset, who 
was then held to be a person, and then [the court] . . . said, you are 
free, even though his owner did not want him to be free.52 
The lower court dismissed and the appellate court affirmed the 
dismissal of the petition based on grounds other than whether Kiko can 
be considered a legal person. The court based its dismissal on the fact 
that the Nonhuman Rights Project, while petitioning for habeas corpus, 
did not seek Kiko’s immediate release, nor did the petition allege that 
 
47 What is the Nonhuman Rights Project?, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, http://www 
.nonhumanrightsproject.org/overview/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
48 See generally NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, Court Cases, http://www.nonhuman 
rightsproject.org/category/courtfilings/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
49 In re The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 2015 NY slip op. 00085 (App. 
Div.); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (2015). 
50 Transcript of Record at 2, In re The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 2015 NY 
slip op. 00085 (App. Div.); 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 148, http://www.nonhuman 
rightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Kiko-Appellate-Court-Transcript-120214 
.pdf. 
51 Id. at 3. 
52 Id. at 4. 
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Kiko’s detention was unlawful. Rather, the court found that the 
Nonhuman Rights Project merely sought to have Kiko transferred to a 
different facility. The court concluded: 
Consequently, even assuming, arguendo, that we agreed with [The 
Nonhuman Rights Project] that Kiko should be deemed a person for 
the purpose of this application, and further assuming, arguendo, that 
[The Nonhuman Rights Project] has standing to commence this 
proceeding on behalf of Kiko, this matter is governed by the line of 
cases standing for the proposition that habeas corpus does not lie 
where a petitioner seeks only to change the conditions of confinement 
rather than the confinement itself.53 
Thus, while denying relief on habeas corpus grounds, the appellate 
division of New York declined to decide the issue of whether Kiko 
could be considered a legal person. 
III 
EQUITABLE SELF-OWNERSHIP: BETWEEN PROPERTY & LEGAL 
PERSONHOOD 
David Favre proposes the theory of equitable self-ownership, an 
alternative approach of providing animals with more legal status while 
still following the common law approach of maintaining their property 
status.54 Favre describes this theory as “a legal paradigm in which a 
nonhuman animal has equitable self-ownership . . . status within the 
legal system, while a human retains legal title to the animal in 
question.”55 While the law recognizes only two distinct categories, 
property or juristic persons, equitable self-ownership would define 
animals as juristic persons without entirely severing the concept of 
property ownership.56 
Favre begins the approach of conceptualizing equitable self-
ownership by distinguishing the fact that: 
[T]oday the ownership of personal property can . . . be separated into 
legal and equitable title.  All owners have the lawful ability to 
separate the title of their personal property into its two components 
and convey those components to others. . . . This relationship is like 
that of a trust in that the equitable title holder has possession and 
 
53 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
54 David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 473 (2000). 
55 Id. at 476. 
56 Id. at 502. 
TATOIAN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2016  11:59 AM 
158 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 31, 147 
control . . . without having the ability to dispose of the legal title of 
the [property].57 
In describing how such a method would work, Favre points to 
history, specifically the use of slavery in Rome and the United States.58 
“In both systems, methods existed by which humans in the status of 
property could be transformed into legal persons . . . within the legal 
system. This could occur by legal instrument done by the owner, or by 
operation of law, even if it was against the will of the owner.”59 Thus, 
Favre argues that if we apply the same methodology used to provide 
slaves legal status to animals, the two methods of dividing legal title 
and equitable title are through explicit action by the owner or by 
operation of the law. 
In the first instance, equitable self-ownership can be accomplished 
by explicit action of the existing title owner;60 this could be 
accomplished “when an individual owner of an animal signs a carefully 
drafted instrument which transfers the equitable title of the animal to 
the animal.”61 Such an instrument should make clear the owner’s 
intention of creating a new legal status for the animal as well as 
stipulate the owner’s acknowledgment of the legal consequences that 
may follow from signing the document.62 The theory acknowledges 
drawbacks of dividing title by such an approach. For one, animals 
cannot understand the importance of such a document giving them 
equitable title.63 However, equitable self-ownership suggests various 
ways to cope with such a drawback, such as tattooing a unique symbol 
on the animal or filing the document in a place in which the legal status 
of the animal could be ascertained.64 However, in reality, both of these 
suggestions appear to be extreme and impracticable because they imply 
that third persons will automatically know what the tattooed symbol 
represents or will take the time to ascertain the status of the animal by 
looking for a filed document. 
A second method by which property could be divided into legal title 
and equitable title under equitable self-ownership is to create “a new 
legal status for domestic animals [through] operation of law, which can 
 
57 Id. at 487–89. 
58 Id. at 491. 
59 Id. at 491–92. 
60 Id. at 492. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 493. 
64 Id. 
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occur either by the actions of the judiciary or by adoption of new 
legislation.”65 According to equitable self-ownership theory, such 
methodology is already in practice, pointing to the fact that “a wild 
animal under the personal ownership of a human will gain equitable 
(and legal) title if she is released back into her natural habitat.”66 
Legislatures could adopt legislation that would cause the involuntary 
transfer of equitable ownership to a class or species of animals.67 By 
doing so, the “nature of having legal title will change, as the legal title 
holder must recognize and take into account the interests of the 
equitable title holder.”68 Thus, Favre argues that such an obligation 
would be similar to that in established in trust law. Because human 
animal owners are currently only subjected to the restrictions of anti-
cruelty and licensing laws, a duty only owed to the state, granting an 
animal equitable title would create an obligation for the legal title 
owner to both the self-owned animal as well as the state.69 
The second proposal is more practicable than the first. Because 
animal owners already owe a duty to the state, for example in anti-
cruelty and licensing contexts, if a state legislature were to adopt the 
equitable title distinction, the change would essentially just extend that 
duty owed to the state to the animal itself. While not overly burdensome 
on any actor, either the legislature or the owner, such a change would 
allow for animals to be protected not only by the state which imposes 
regulations on owners, but would essentially place an affirmative duty 
on the legal title owner to the animal, the equitable title owner. 
Favre’s two equitable self-ownership’s focus on the division of title 
into legal and equitable is crucial because, unlike other scholars arguing 
for a complete transition into non-property status, he points to the fact 
that human retention of legal title is vital vis-à-vis the duty of care.70 
Under our present property system, full responsibility comes with 
ownership and because “[m]ost animals within the domestic control of 
humans are not capable of self-care . . . it is important that legal 
ownership continues to exist so that responsibility for the care of the 
self-owned animal can be squarely placed on a specific human.”71 
 
65 Id. at 494. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 495. 
71 Id. 
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Equitable self-ownership is a helpful concept in that it recognizes that 
the drastic shift away from animals being personal property is not really 
feasible. Rather, equitable self-ownership allows for animals to gain 
more legal status without granting them complete legal personhood. 
Equitable self-ownership recognizes that the duty to care for animals 
by their owners is a critical facet that needs to be maintained; a method 
to maintain that duty is to divide the title of animals into legal title and 
equitable title. By doing so, the legal titleholder owes affirmative duties 
to the equitable titleholder rather than just to the state. 
IV 
ALTERING THE COMMON LAW WITH FESSENDEN & NIX 
In August of 2014, the Oregon Supreme Court decided two cases 
that arguably expand the rights of animals in a way that shifts farther 
away from notions of animals as purely property. First, in State v. Nix,72 
the court, through statutory interpretation, recognized for the first time 
that animals could be legal victims. The facts of Nix are as follows: 
Acting on a tip, police officers entered defendant’s farm and found 
dozens of emaciated animals, mostly horses and goats, and several 
animal carcasses in various states of decay. Defendant owned those 
animals. Defendant was indicted on 23 counts of first-degree animal 
neglect, ORS 167.330, and 70 counts of second-degree animal 
neglect, ORS 167.325. Each separate count identified a different 
animal and charged conduct by defendant toward that animal. All of 
the separate counts were alleged to have occurred within the same 
span of time. A jury convicted defendant of 20 counts of second-
degree animal abuse. At defendant’s sentencing hearing . . . [the trial 
court] merged the guilty verdicts into a single conviction, explaining 
that . . . animals are not victims as defined by [ORS 161.067(2)] . . . 
Defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail and three years of bench 
probation; the trial court suspended imposition of the jail sentence, 
and the state appealed.73 
On appeal, the issue before the court was whether animals could be 
considered victims within Oregon’s anti-merger statute. The anti-
merger statute provides, in pertinent part, that “when the same conduct 
or criminal episode, though violating only one statutory provision 
involves two or more victims, there are as many separately punishable 
offenses as there are victims.”74 The state argued that the text, context, 
 
72 State v. Nix (Nix II), 355 Or. 777 (2014), vacated, 356 Or. 768 (2015). 
73 State v. Nix (Nix I), 251 Or. App. 449, 451-52 (2012), aff’d, 355 Or. 777 (2014), 
vacated, 356 Or. 768 (2015). 
74 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.067(2) (2013). 
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and legislative history of the second-degree animal neglect statute 
make clear that the legislature intended the neglected animals to be the 
victims of the offense.75 The defendant responded arguing that the 
ordinary meaning of the term “victim” does not include nonhuman 
animals and, under Oregon law, animals are treated as the property of 
their owners.76 
The court then engaged in statutory interpretation to determine 
whether animals could be considered victims under the anti-merger 
statute. In its opinion, the court stated: 
Oregon’s anti-merger statute provides that, when a defendant is 
found guilty of committing multiple crimes during a single criminal 
episode, those guilty verdicts ‘merge’ into a single conviction, unless 
they are subject to one of a series of exceptions. One of those 
exceptions is ORS 161.067(2), which provides that, “[w]hen the 
same conduct or criminal episode, though violating only one 
statutory provision [,] involves two or more victims, there are as 
many separately punishable offenses as there are victims.”77 
The court explained that in the text of the statute, the ordinary 
meaning of the word “victim” was capable of referring either to human 
beings, animals, or both.78 The court went on to say that “the phrasing 
of the statute—which refers to the violation of another statutory 
provision—suggests that the meaning of the word ‘victim’ will depend 
on the underlying substantive statute that the defendant violated.”79 
Thus, whether animals could be considered victims within the anti-
merger statute depended on the underlying substantive statute, which 
in Nix was second-degree animal neglect. Oregon’s second-degree 
animal neglect statute provides, in pertinent part, that “a person 
commits the crime of animal neglect in the second degree if, except as 
otherwise authorized by law, the person intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence fails to provide minimum care 
for an animal in such person’s custody or control.”80 In examining the 
underlying substantive statute, the court found that “the phrasing of the 
offense reveal[ed] that the legislature’s focus was the treatment of 
individual animals, not harm to the public generally or harm to the 
 
75 Nix II, 355 Or. at 789–90. 
76 Id. at 790. 
77 Id. at 782. 
78 Id. at 783. 
79 Id. at 784 (emphasis added). 
80 OR. REV. STAT. § 167.325 (2013). 
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owners of the animals. The offense is committed by failing to provide 
required care to ‘an animal,’ regardless of who owns it.”81 Therefore, 
reading the text of the anti-merger statute in context with the underlying 
substantive statute, the court found that the legislature’s focus was on 
the treatment of individual animals. The court concluded, “in any 
reasonable sense of the word, the ‘victim’ of those offenses is the 
individual animal that suffers the neglect, injury, cruelty, torture, or 
death.”82 In holding that animals could be considered victims within 
the anti-merger statute, the court found that the trial court had erred by 
merging the 20 counts of second-degree animal neglect into a single 
conviction and reversed for resentencing.83 Thus, an animal could be a 
legal victim of its owner’s abuse or neglect. 
The Nix court noted the shift from animals as mere property in 
context of anti-cruelty statutes, explaining that “the focus of the statute 
was the treatment of the animals themselves, with no mention of proof 
of economic loss to the owner or harm to the public.”84 However, the 
court also cautioned the decision was not one of policy about whether 
animals are deserving of such treatment under the law, reserving that 
decision for the legislature.85 
In any event, the holding of Nix extended the rights of animals to be 
treated as individual victims within the anti-merger statute. Thus, if the 
underlying statute for which a defendant is charged presumes that 
animals can be victims for that offense, that defendant’s sentence does 
not qualify for a “merged” sentence, but rather the defendant will face 
a sentence for each individual count of guilt. While such application is 
seemingly narrow to statutes such as animal neglect and animal abuse, 
the ability for animals to be deemed victims is a far cry from animals 
holding mere property status. In no other context would property be 
deemed a victim; for example, the law school favorite Blackacre could 
not be considered a victim if its owner decided to burn it down. 
Remarkably, Nix was vacated by the Oregon Supreme Court for a 
procedural error. Namely, it was brought to the Court’s attention that 
the state lacked the authority to appeal the defendant’s conviction 
because the conviction was for a misdemeanor. Luckily, the Oregon 
Court of Appeals adopted the Nix principles in State v. Hess, 273 Or 
 
81 Nix II, 355 Or. at 790. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 798. 
84 Id. at 794. 
85 Id. at 798. 
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App 26, 35 (2015). The court acknowledged that Nix was vacated for 
procedural reasons and stated, “we nonetheless are persuaded by the 
Nix court’s reasoning on the merger question, and we adopt it.”86 
The companion case to Nix was State v. Fessenden.87 Fessenden was 
unique in that the Oregon Supreme Court applied the exigent 
circumstances exception to animals, which allowed for a police officer 
to seize an emaciated horse without a warrant. The facts of Fessenden 
were as follows: 
[A neighbor] called the sheriff’s office to report that the horse 
appeared to be starving. An officer with specialized training in animal 
husbandry and in investigating animal cruelty was dispatched to 
investigate. . . . From the driveway, the officer observed that the 
horse’s backbone protruded, her withers stood up, her neck was thin, 
all of her ribs were visible, she had no visible fatty tissue in her 
shoulders, and she was “swaying a little bit,” all of which the officer 
recognized as signs of emaciation. . . . At that point, before entering 
defendant’s property, the officer believed that the horse was suffering 
from malnourishment and presented a medical emergency. . . . He 
therefore entered the property, seized the horse, and immediately 
took her to a veterinarian.88 
Fessenden, the co-owner of the horse, was charged with second-
degree animal neglect. At trial, the officer testified that the horse was 
the thinnest horse he had ever seen and he was afraid that if the horse 
fell over, it would not be able to get back up and would need to be 
euthanized.89 Believing that it would take between four to six hours 
before he could obtain a warrant, and that the horse could fall over in 
between that time, the officer testified that he believed he was faced 
with a medical emergency.90 The defendants, co-owners of the horse, 
moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the officer’s seizure, 
arguing that the officer’s acts violated the warrant requirement of 
Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.91 In response, the state 
argued that the emergency aid and exigent circumstances exceptions to 
the warrant requirement permitted the officer’s entry and seizure of the 
 
86 State v. Hess, 273 Or. App. 26, 35 (2015). 
87 State v. Fessenden, 355 Or. 759 (2014). 
88 Id. at 761–62. 
89 Id. at 761. 
90 Id. at 761–62. 
91 Id. at 762–63. 
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horse.92 The trial court denied defendants’ motion to suppress and the 
jury convicted defendants as charged.93 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the officer’s warrantless 
entry and seizure were lawful under the emergency aid exception to the 
warrant requirement.94 The Court of Appeals explained its finding 
based on the emergency aid exception as follows: 
[T]he societal interest in protecting nonhuman animals from 
unnecessary pain, injury, trauma, and cruel death can justify . . . a 
warrantless search or seizure aimed at preventing or alleviating that 
suffering. . . . We hold that a warrantless search or seizure is justified 
when law enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief, 
based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is necessary to 
render immediate aid or assistance to animals that have suffered, or 
which are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical 
injury or cruel death, unless that injury or death is being inflicted 
lawfully.95 
The Oregon Supreme Court did not decide Fessenden under the 
emergency aid exception,96 but rather focused its holding under the 
exigent circumstances exception. In its opinion, the court stated that 
“Oregon law still considers animals to be property”97 and that 
“[d]omestic animals . . . receive special consideration under Oregon 
law” because they “occupy a unique position in people’s hearts and in 
the law.”98 The court continued in dicta by saying, “[a]s we continue to 
learn more about the interrelated nature of all life, the day may come 
when humans perceive less separation between themselves and other 
living beings than the law now reflects.”99 In its exigent circumstances 
analysis, the court explained “[the exception] permits warrantless 
action when necessary to prevent serious damage to ‘property’” but that 
“[the court] has not yet applied that exception to permit warrantless 
measures to protect property.”100 Even more compelling, the court 
concluded its opinion by stating that while the holding of this case may 
appear narrow, the court does not suggest that the circumstances in 
 
92 Id. at 763. 
93 Id. 
94 State v. Fessenden, 258 Or. App. 639, 646 (2013), aff’d, 355 Or. 759 (2014). 
95 Id. at 763–64. 
96 By not deciding the case under the emergency aid exception, the court did not decide 
whether the exception could or could not be used for animals in future instances. 
97 Fessenden, 355 Or. at 767. 
98 Id. at 768–69. 
99 Id. at 769–70. 
100 Id. at 771. 
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Fessenden are “the only ones in which an officer may take warrantless 
measures to prevent serious harm to or the death of an animal.”101 Such 
a statement suggests that the court may be willing to expand its holding 
to allow for warrantless entries and seizures of animals in other 
circumstances. 
V 
IMPLICATIONS OF FESSENDEN & NIX IN CHANGING NOTIONS OF 
ANIMALS AS PROPERTY 
While the holdings of Fessenden and Nix may appear to conflict, in 
one the court concludes that animals may be deemed property while in 
the other explicitly states that animals are still considered property, in 
conjunction the two holdings may be a great leap for animal rights in 
Oregon. While the Fessenden court based its ruling on exigent 
circumstances to protect property, the fact that the property in question 
was a living creature, and not an inanimate object, was given great 
weight in the court’s decision. So, while the court continues to accept 
the common law notion of the horse being property, it allowed for an 
expansion in warrantless search and seizure cases where the property 
in question was a living animal. The Nix holding (adopted by Hess) is 
critical because it provides a further incentive for animal owners to 
provide adequate care for their animals; no longer will an owner 
neglecting more than one animal have their sentence clumped together, 
rather that owner will face separate sentences for each animal he 
neglected. The Nix holding will affect the way in which judges may 
sentence those prosecuted under animal welfare statutes in Oregon in a 
way that will provide justice for each animal harmed. 
Together, these holdings may be laying the foundation for equitable 
self-ownership because they allow for sentient beings to carry greater 
worth than mere property. Fessenden may be read to expand a person’s 
duty to not neglect living sentient property. Whereas the anti-neglect 
statutes provide duties owed to the state, equitable self-ownership 
would place affirmative duties owed to the living sentient property 
itself. Similarly, in Nix, where the court recognized that animals could 
be legal victims, the concept of equitable self-ownership is applicable. 
While the owner owes affirmative duties to the state to not neglect the 
animals, the holding that each animal is a victim for sentencing can 
easily transition into the owner owing affirmative duties to the animal 
 
101 Id. at 774. 
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as well. Although not exactly in line with Favre’s equitable self-
ownership theory, Nix and Fessenden may be laying the foundation to 
the ability to provide animals with duties owed to them by their legal 
titleholders. 
Fessenden and Nix provide a critical step in the right direction 
towards attaining better protection for animals, which may not be too 
surprising considering that Oregon has been ranked third in the nation 
for animal protection laws.102 Oregon appears to be on the leading side 
of animal welfare statutes, affording more protection for animals and 
greater punishment for those that mistreat them. Oregon’s legislature 
has already created felony penalties for animal cruelty, fighting, and 
neglect.103 Now, Oregon’s judicial law is continuing to expand animal 
jurisprudence by ensuring that those statutes are interpreted in a way 
that create greater implications for those who violate them. 
CONCLUSION 
Continuing changes in statutory enactments and judicial 
interpretations of statutory law have created a space where animals no 
longer hold merely a property status. Instead, they occupy a space 
somewhere in between inanimate personal property and legal 
personhood. While that space may not be defined as of yet, it is obvious 
that the trend in most states has moved away from perceiving animals 
the same way intangible objects of personal property are perceived. 
Rather, expansions in statutory protections and subsequent judicial law 
interpretations of those statutes suggest that animals can be afforded 
more justice. While it is unlikely that animals will ever attain full legal 
personhood similar to humans, it is likely that state legislatures and 
courts will be more willing to ensure animal safety and wellbeing via a 
different route. Rather than having the ability to sue for their own 
freedom or damages, animals are slowly being afforded more and more 
protections to ensure that those who mistreat them are punished to the 
fullest extent. With such statutes on the books, there will be less of an 
incentive for, or a greater fear from, people who mistreat animals. 
 
102 ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 2014 U.S. Animal Protection Laws Rankings, 7, 
http://aldf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-United-States-Animal-Protection-Laws   
-Rankings.pdf. 
103 Id. at 10. 
